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Comment
A Unified Approach to Predatory Pricing Analysis
Under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman
Acts: A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre
Farms, Inc., A Case Against the Tide
Caire Taylor-Sherman
Alleging competitive injury from price discrimination, A.A.
Poultry Farms sued its competitor Rose Acre Farms1 under the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.2 A.A.
Poultry Farms and the other plaintiffs contended that Rose
Acre's lower-priced "specials"3 constituted price discrimina-
tion.4 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that Rose Acre priced its
specials below its cost of production, which they claimed consti-
tuted predatory pricing.5 The jury returned a verdict for the
1. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 680
(S.D. Ind. 1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1019
(1990). The defendant Rose Acre Farms was a vertically integrated egg pro-
ducer and processor located near Indianapolis. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1397-98.
An egg producer owns the chickens which lay the eggs, while an egg processor
packages and resells the eggs. I& at 1397. The first named plaintiff, A.A.
Poultry Farms, and the six other plaintiff owners, however, were egg proces-
sors only. Id. at 1398. An unintegrated processor purchases eggs from farmers
and then packages them for resale. Id at 1397.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). Although the plaintiffs did not initially bring
suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), they litigated the case as
though they had done so. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1399. The court acknowl-
edged that the federal system of notice pleading allowed this. Id Counsel
then briefed the appeal using both acts, and the Seventh Circuit analyzed the
allegations under both acts. Id. at 1400.
3. Specials in the egg market arise due to particular market characteris-
tics. For example, buyers seek to buy eggs of a certain size, yet chickens lay
eggs of many sizes, not all of which meet customers' desires. Because eggs are
perishable, suppliers must sell them quickly. To dispose of eggs of the "wrong
size," firms either sell them to companies that use the eggs as raw material for
their finished products ("breakers") or to supermarkets at concessionary
prices ("specials"). Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1397. Rose Acre sold its surplus eggs
to supermarkets as specials at prices lower than its other eggs. IHi
4. Id.
5. Id The Rose Acre court defined predatory pricing as "the sequence
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plaintiffs, with treble damages amounting to $27.9 million.6
The federal district court, however, granted Rose Acre's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the plaintiffs ap-
pealed.7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.8
The Seventh Circuit stated that Supreme Court precedent
mandates a different analysis of predatory pricing claims under
the Sherman Act than it does under the Robinson-Patman
Act.9 This dual approach under the two Acts stands in stark
contrast to a wave of judicial support for using a unified ap-
proach to analyze predatory pricing claims under the Sherman
and Robinson-Patman Acts.10 Unless antitrust law or prece-
dent mandates different analyses for these claims, a unified ap-
proach not only simplifies the analysis, but also provides a
rational framework for applying the antitrust laws."
This Comment argues that the Rose Acre court needlessly
complicated predatory pricing analysis under the antitrust laws
by following a dual approach. Part I is two-fold. First, it re-
views the statutory background of antitrust law, including the
notion of reconciling the various laws. Second, it outlines the
courts' interpretation and application of these laws, including
the impact of economic analysis in more recent predatory pric-
ing cases. Part II details the holding in Rose Acre, concentrat-
ing on the Seventh Circuit's dual approach to predatory pricing
analysis under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. Part
III questions the Seventh Circuit's use of precedent in reaching
its decision. This Comment advocates the use of a unified ap-
proach to predatory pricing analysis under the Sherman and
Robinson-Patman Acts.'2
low-price-now-high-price-later." Id at 1400; see infra part I.A. (discussing the
concept of predatory pricing).
6. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1397.
7. Id
8. Id at 1408.
9. Id. at 1404 (stating that despite widespread criticism, Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), which defined the proper method
of analysis for Robinson-Patman Act claims, had not been overruled, and was
thus binding precedent on federal appellate courts).
10. See infra part I.C.3.
11. See infra notes 28-33. The Supreme Court has admonished the lower
courts to interpret Robinson-Patman Act standards to conform with other an-
titrust laws. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 346 U.S.
61, 63 (1953).
12. In the area of predatory pricing, it is as important to outline what an
article will not cover as what it will cover because of the controversy over a
proper test or methodology to discern predatory pricing. See Rose Acre, 881
F.2d at 1400 (citing cases and articles referring to "recent cases in and out of
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I. PREDATORY PRICING UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
A. PREDATORY PRICING
Courts and commentators use the phrase "predatory pric-
ig" to describe pricing behavior that injures competition.1 3 A
"predatory" firm prices its products uneconomically low for a
variety of noncompetitive reasons, including a desire to "drive
rivals from the marketplace, force them to sell out on favorable
terms, or discipline them for failure to conform to the wishes of
the firm practicing such pricing."14 A firm practicing predatory
pricing will sacrifice current revenues and profits in order to
create a monopoly, then recoup its losses at monopoly prices in
the absence of competition.15 The Sherman and Robinson-Pat-
man Acts prohibit the practice of predatory pricing.16
B. THE STATUTES
Plaintiffs can and do allege injury from predatory pricing
under both the Sherman Act17 and the Robinson-Patman Act.' 8
this circuit struggl[ing] with the appropriate price-cost relation"); see also in-
fra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (outlining three distinct tests courts use
to discern predatory pricing). While this Comment addresses whether courts
should apply different tests to discern predatory pricing under the Sherman
and Robinson-Patman Acts, it does not address which of the various tests is
the "best" test to apply.
13. See George A. Hay, The Economics of Predatory Pricing, 51 ANTI-
TRusT L.J. 361, 362 (1982).
14. Daniel J. Gifford, Primary-Line Injury Under the Robinson-Patman
Act- The Development of Standards and Erosion of Enforcement, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 3 n.3 (1979).
15. 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAw I 711b
(1978).
16. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. When discussing preda-
tory pricing claims under the Robinson-Patman Act, courts and commentators
speak interchangeably of either the Clayton Act or the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), amended the Clayton
Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
As a matter of convention, however, most people use the designation "Robin-
son-Patman Act" even though it is the original Clayton Act which deals with
predatory pricing claims. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The
name of the act becomes important when one researches the statute's legisla-
tive history to aid interpretation and application. Although this Comment's
discussion centers on predatory pricing, it will follow convention and refer to a
violation of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act, as a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1988).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988); see A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose
Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir. 1989) (litigating a predatory
pricing claim under both Acts), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 189019 to "protect trade
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies. '20
For a variety of reasons, Congress passed a law of general prin-
ciple,21 leaving the often formidable task of fleshing out the law
to the courts.22 Reacting to the continued growth of big busi-
ness23 and seemingly "soft" judicial enforcement,2 Congress
19. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). President Benjamin Harri-
son signed the Sherman Act into law on July 2, 1890 1 EARL W. KINTNER,
FEDERAL ANTrRUST LAW § 4.17, at 238 (1980).
20. This quote from the Sherman Act's formal title succinctly describes
why Congress passed the bill. H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1890), reprinted in 1 EARL W. KniTNER, THE LEGISLATwE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAws AND RELATED STATUTES 295 (1978) ("The object of
the bill is ... [t]o protect trade and commerce among the several [s]tates...
against unlawful restraints and monopoly."). The Supreme Court succinctly
stated its own view of the Sherman Act's purpose in Northern Paciic Railway
Co. v. United States:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained inter-
action of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an envi-
ronment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions.... [T]he policy unequivocally laid down by the
Act is competition.
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
21. At the time it enacted the Sherman Act, Congress was just beginning
to test its regulatory powers. See 1 KINTNER, supra note 19, § 4.1. This situa-
tion, plus the fact that Congress aimed the legislation at all businesses during
a time of changing economic conditions, led Congress to pass a general law. Id.
22. In its early decisions, the Supreme Court tended to interpret the Sher-
man Act strictly, using the Act's language to define its parameters. For in-
stance, the Court emphasized the statute's language in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, declaring that Congress intended the Sherman Act to
prohibit every contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrained trade with-
out regard to whether such restraint had previously been held reasonable
under common law. 166 U.S. 290, 328, 340-41 (1897). The Court soon reverted,
however, to a more flexible approach of common law reasonableness as it de-
veloped the "rule of reason" to analyze many, if not most, alleged violations.
At least as early as 1898, the Court realized that "[t]he act of Congress must
have a reasonable construction or else there would scarcely be an agreement
or contract among businessmen that could not be said to have, indirectly or
remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it."
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898). In Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, the Court formally enunciated the "rule of reason," stating that
Congress intended the Sherman Act to protect interstate and foreign com-
merce from undue restraints but did not intend to restrain the right to make
and enforce contracts that did not constitute undue restraints. 221 U.S. 1, 60
(1911). Although Standard Oil judges the validity of a restraint under § 1 of
the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court suggested that the rule of reason applied
to § 2 (the anti-monopolization provision) as well. Id.
23. See 3 KINTNER, supra note 19, § 18.2, at 5 n.39 ("During the Clayton
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later passed the Clayton Act.'s The Clayton Act specifically
proscribed certain trade practices that Congress deemed partic-
ularly inimical to free competition.26 Due to an increase in
price discrimination stemming from the advent of mass mer-
chandisers, Congress amended section 2 of the Clayton Act in
Act debates, one senator compiled a list of 628 trusts, many of which, he
stated, were formed between 1898 and 1908.").
24. The "soft" enforcement refers to the rule of reason enunciated in
Standard Oil. 221 U.S. at 60.
25. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27
(1988)). As originally enacted, § 2 of the Clayton Act read as follows: "It shall
be unlawful for any person... to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities... where the effect of such discrimination may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce .... " Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730 (1914) (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988)) (emphasis added). Congress hoped this law
would curb liberal judicial interpretation, exemplified by Standard Oil's rule
of reason, see 221 U.S. at 60, and provide for more certainty in enforcement. 3
KITNER, supra note 19, § 18.2, at 6. Congress also passed the Federal Trade
Commission Act in 1914 to clarify regulation of abusive trade practices further.
Id.
26. The Clayton Act forbids such practices as price discrimination, tying
and exclusive dealing arrangements, mergers, and interlocking directorates.
15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 14, 18-20 (1988). In passing the Act, Congress was con-
cerned about geographic price cutting by large sellers who aim to drive smaller
competitors out of business. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1914),
reprinted in 2 KINTNER, supra note 20, at 1090-91. The House Judiciary Com-
mittee stated that:
Section 2 of the [Clayton Act] is intended to prevent unfair discrimi-
nations. It is expressly designed with the view of correcting and for-
bidding a common and widespread unfair trade practice whereby
certain great corporations and also certain smaller concerns which
seek to secure a monopoly in trade and commerce by aping the meth-
ods of the great corporations, have heretofore endeavored to destroy
competition and render unprofitable the business of competitors by
selling their goods, wares, and merchandise at a [lower] price in the
particular 'communities where their rivals are engaged in business
than [in] other places throughout the country ... The necessity for
legislation to prevent unfair discriminations in prices with a view of
destroying competition needs little argument to sustain the wisdom of
it.... [The report provided the specific examples of] the Standard Oil
Co., and the American Tobacco Co., and others of less notoriety, but
of great influence-[which] lower[ed] prices of their commodities,
often times below the cost of production in certain communities and
sections where they had competition, with the... ultimate purpose in
view of thereby acquiring a monopoly in the particular locality or sec-
tion in which the discriminating price is made.
Id. (emphasis added).
Today courts refer to price discrimination between competitors at the
seller's level as primary line discrimination or primary line injury. See Janich
Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied,
439 U.S. 829 (1978). This Comment addresses this type of antitrust injury.
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1936 by passing the Robinson-Patman Act.2
Although there are several antitrust laws, passed at differ-
ent times to address certain specified needs, courts must not in-
terpret them individually in a vacuum.28 The Supreme Court
admonished the lower courts in Automatic Canteen v. Federal
27. Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 13-13b, 21a (1988)). A new form of price discrimination had emerged by the
1930s with the growth of chain stores. See 3 KINrNER, supra note 19, § 19.1, at
44 (explaining that mass merchandisers had the power to obtain price conces-
sions from manufacturers); FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 5 (1962) ("Between 1926 and 1933 chain
stores nearly tripled their share of total retail sales-from 9 to 25 per cent.")
(footnote omitted). In this new form, price discrimination had moved from the
seller level to the buyer level. Courts and scholars refer to price discrimina-
tion at the buyer level as secondary line discrimination. See International Air
Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 720-21 n.11 (5th Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); 3 KINTNER, supra note 19, § 22.1, at 249. Secondary
line discrimination or injury is not of concern in this Comment except that its
existence gave rise to the Robinson-Patman Act amendments to the Clayton
Act. The Robinson-Patman Act amendments extended the original Clayton
Act language, adding the phrase shown in italics below to the statute's clause
concerning the effect of the price discrimination:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them ....
Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526, 1526 (1936) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988)).
Although this Comment does not focus on secondary line injury, it is im-
portant to understand the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act because some
courts have mistakenly drawn upon the language which these amendments ad-
ded to the Clayton Act in their analysis of predatory pricing claims, even
though the original Clayton Act covers this sort of injury. In his introductory
remarks to the Robinson-Patman Act, Representative Wright Patman stated
that "[the Robinson-Patman Act] is designed to accomplish what so far the
Clayton Act has only weakly attempted, namely, to protect the independent
merchant, the public whom he serves, and the manufacturer from whom he
buys, from exploitation by his chain competitor." 79 CONG. REC. 9077 (1935)
(statement by Rep. Wright Patman), reprinted in 4 KINTNER, supra note 20, at
2927.
The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary characterized the
Robinson-Patman Act's purpose as "propos[ing] to amend section 2 of the
Clayton Act so as to suppress more effectually discrimination between custom-
ers of the same seller not supported by sound economic differences in their
business position or in the cost of serving them." S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936), reprinted in 4 KITNER, supra note 20, at 3014 (emphasis ad-
ded). These examples point to Congress's preoccupation with the ill effects of
price discrimination at the secondary level, which encompasses injury to spe-
cific competitors rather than injury to competition in general.
28. See Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (8th Cir. 1987).
1288 [Vol. 76:1283
PREDATORY PRICING
Trade Commission 29 to reconcile the Robinson-Patman Act
with broader antitrust policies laid down by Congress.30 The
Automatic Canteen Court also warned against interpretations
of the Robinson-Patman Act which "extend beyond the
prohibitions of the Act and, in doing so, help give rise to a price
uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of
other antitrust legislation."31 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,32 the Supreme Court reiter-
ated that the Robinson-Patman Act is to "be construed consist-
ently with broader policies of the antitrust laws." 33
Predatory pricing analysis can play a central role in claims
brought under both the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts.3
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits attempts to monopolize
or maintain a monopoly;35 a firm can employ predatory pricing
as one means to accomplish these prohibited acts.36 Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, proof that a competitor engaged in pred-
atory pricing satisfies one element of a prima facie claim.37
29. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
30. 1.& at 63.
31. Id.
32. 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
33. I& at 80 n.13.
34. Congress did not necessarily intend these two Acts to cover the same
injury. Yet historical conditions and the courts' interpretations of the Acts, re-
fined by an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the nature of the inju-
ries, have led courts to condemn predatory pricing under both Acts. Since
1975, courts have utilized more economic analysis in predatory pricing analysis.
James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The
Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63, 94-96 (1982); Paul H. LaRue, The
Robinson-Patman Act. The Great Issues and Personalities, 55 ANTITRUST L.J.
135, 146 (1986). Through the application of economic analysis to alleged Robin-
son-Patman Act violations, most courts recognize injury only if discriminatory
pricing is predatory. See Daniel G. Gifford, Recent Developments in Antitrust
Law, MINN. STATE BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST SEC. NEWS, July 1991, at 1, 16-17;
LaRue, supra, at 144.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize,... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ).
36. See Terry Calvani & James M. Lynch, Predatory Pricing Under the
Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts: An Introduction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J.
375, 375 (1982) (stating that proof of predation is often crucial to finding "mo-
nopolization" or "attempted monopolization" under the Sherman Act).
If a firm attempts to monopolize, it seeks to rid itself of competition by
engaging in any of a variety of illegal conduct. This illegal conduct includes
not only predatory pricing, but also "industrial espionage or sabotage, false ad-
vertising, threats, exclusive dealing, tying arrangements, and agreements with
competitors to exclude rivals." E. THoMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAmP,
ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY & PROCEDURE 617 (2d ed. 1989).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). A plaintiff who brings a claim under § 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act must prove two essential elements: price discrimi-
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Thus when a firm uses predatory pricing in a discriminatory
nation and anticompetitive or potential anticompetitive effect. Id. Price dis-
crimination is merely a difference in price. Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960). Anticompetitive effect in a pri-
mary line context generally requires proof that a firm's pricing has or will
hurt competition in general. See Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570
F.2d 848, 855 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977) ("It is clear that there can be no violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act if the price difference has no adverse effect on com-
petition."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); International Air Indus. v. Ameri-
can Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 1975) ("It is settled law that a
mere diversion of business from one competitor to another does not signify
detriment to competition on the seller level." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 943 (1976). But see Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866
F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Unlike the Sherman Act, which protects 'compe-
tition, not competitors,' the Robinson-Patman Act extends its protection to
competitors." (citation omitted)); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre
Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Utah Pie to stand
for protection of sellers' competitors, rather than protection of competition in
general), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990). Use of the proper standard of an-
ticompetitive effect-injury to competition in general or to a specific competi-
tor-is key to an analysis of predatory pricing claims.
Proof of anticompetitive effect is the critical element of a Robinson-Pat-
man Act claim. There are two primary modes of proving this competitive in-
jury. First, a plaintiff can prove injury through a general market analysis.
D.E. Rogers Assocs. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1439 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984). Second, courts infer competitive injury from
the presence of predatory intent, which in turn courts can infer from proof of
predatory conduct-a "double inference test." See id. (citing Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696-98 (1967)); William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1040-41 (9th Cir.
1981) (citing Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 696-98), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Pa-
cific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International Air, 517 F.2d at 722-23; see also Rob-
ert R. Vawter, Jr. & Sharyn B. Zuch, A Critical Analysis of Recent Federal
Appellate Decisions on Predatory Pricing, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 401, 401 (1982)
("Predatory intent may be inferred from below-cost prices, and competitive
harm may then be inferred from the inferred predatory intent."); see i7Lfra
note 54 (discussing Utah Pie's establishment of the double inference test). If a
court uses the double inference test, however, the actionable "predatory con-
duct" in the context of a Robinson-Patman Act claim is predatory pricing.
When a court looks for the presence of predatory pricing, the court is relying
on objective evidence of predatory intent.
Other courts have shortened this chain of inference and allow direct sub-
jective evidence of predatory intent. For example, courts interpret memo-
randa or comments containing subjective phrases such as "we are going to run
you out of business," or similar threats, as direct evidence of predatory intent.
See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1500 (11th Cir.
1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). Courts and scholars have discussed at
length the proper role and possible dangers of subjective intent in predatory
pricing claims. See id. at 1500 ("Congress intended for subjective evidence of a
defendant's intent to be relevant. Predatory pricing provides only objective,
circumstantial evidence of predatory intent."). Contra Barry Wright Corp. v.
ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that subjective in-
tent is irrelevant to a predatory pricing claim); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTI-
1290 [Vol. 76:1283
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manner in an attempt to monopolize, a plaintiff can prevail
under both Acts if jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.38
C. THE CASE LAW
1. Utah Pie
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.39 represents the na-
dir of the Supreme Court's analysis of predatory pricing under
the Robinson-Patman Act.40 Much to the surprise and dismay
of subsequent courts and commentators, 4 1 the Court found that
the defendants, which had priced their products below "cost" as
their industry experienced a "drastically declining price struc-
ture," had violated the Robinson-Patman Act.4 With the bene-
fit of today's more sophisticated economic analysis, it has
become clear that this situation more likely reflected a market
experiencing increased competition rather than a market in
which a defendant had hurt competition.43
TRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 188-90 (1976) ("What juries (and
many judges) do not understand is that the availability of evidence of im-
proper intent is often a function of luck and of the defendant's legal sophisti-
cation, not of the underlying reality."); Michael C. Quinn, Predatory Pricing
Strategies: The Relevance of Intent Under Antitrust, Unfair Competition and
Tort Law, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 607, 621 (1990) ("It appears that some plain-
tiffs, through clever lawyering, attempt to cajole juries into awarding treble
damages under the Sherman Act and [Robinson-Patman Act] where, in fact,
there is no real antitrust injury.").
38. Courts and commentators identify these jurisdictional requirements as
follows:
1. There must be a certain involvement with interstate commerce;
2. There must be a "discrimination" in "price";
3. The discrimination must be "between different purchasers," i.e., it
must involve more than one purchase from the same seller,
4. The sale must be of "commodities";
5. The commodities sold must be "of like grade and quality"; and
6. The commodities must be sold "for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States" or any territory or the District of
Columbia.
3 KNTER, supra note 19, § 21.1, at 144 (citations omitted).
39. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
40. LaRue, supra note 34, at 144.
41. See ic at 144-45 (discussing the Utah Pie analysis); see also A.A. Poul-
try Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Nary a voice has been heard in support of Utah Pie in years. [There is] uni-
versal academic disdain for that case."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
42. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 690, 696 n.12, 698, 701.
43. See LaRue, supra note 34, at 144 ("In the older cases .... [m]arket
analyses made to determine the effect of a price discrimination upon competi-
tion were notably unsophisticated from an economics standpoint."); see also
Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1404 ("Scholars have cogently argued that Utah Pie em-
ployed the Robinson-Patman Act to condemn the process by which competi-
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The plaintiff in Utah Pie, a small, local pie baker in busi-
ness in Salt Lake City for thirty years, entered the frozen pie
market in late 1957." The company was immediately success-
ful and by the end of 1958 it controlled two-thirds of the Salt
Lake City market.45 Responding to this successful market en-
trant, several national competitors46 fought back with the most
effective competitive weapon in the frozen pie market-price.47
The national firms lowered their prices in Utah, but not else-
where, to keep and attract business. 48
Responding to this situation, Utah Pie charged the national
competitors with conspiracy under the Sherman Act and price
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.49 A jury found
for the defendants on the Sherman Act conspiracy charge, but
for Utah Pie on the Robinson-Patman claim.-s  Although the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,51 the Supreme Court
found sufficient evidence to support a finding of competitive in-
jury, thereby allowing the plaintiff to recover under the Robin-
son-Patman Act.52
The Supreme Court's analysis of the requisite competitive
injury lacks clarity and precision. Although an enunciation of
the proper competitive injury standard is key to the analysis,
the Court failed to clarify which standard it used: injury to
competition in general, or the lesser standard of injury to a spe-
cific competitor.5 3 Regarding pricing, the Court stated that the
tion creeps into oligopolistic markets and undercuts excessive prices."). Even
at the time of Utah Pie, however, the dissent recognized that the market had
become more, not less, competitive. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 705 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
44. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 689.
45. Id at 689, 705.
46. The competitors were: Continental Baking Co., Carnation Co., and
Pet Milk Co. Id- at 687.
47. Id. at 690, 692.
48. I&
49. Id at 687.
50. Id at 687-88.
51. The Tenth Circuit found insufficient evidence to support a finding of
injury to competition. Id at 693, 699, 701-02. Among other considerations, the
court "placed heavy emphasis on the fact that Utah Pie constantly increased
its sales volume and continued to make a profit." I&. at 702.
52. Id. at 702-03.
53. IAd at 695, 698, 700, 701-03 (speaking of the need to show injury to com-
petition). But see id. at 696, 699, 700 (speaking in terms of injury to Utah Pie
or simply, a specific competitor). Perhaps the most telling indication of lack of
clarity appears in the opinion's conclusion. The Court stated:
Section 2(a) does not forbid price competition which will probably in-
jure or lessen competition by eliminating competitors ..... But Con-
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defendants had sold below cost, but apparently only below av-
erage total cost.M4 Looking at the effect of all market partici-
pants' pricing, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
market's price structure had "deteriorated rapidly"5 5 or was
"drastically declining. '56 Concurrently, the Court disingenu-
gress has established some ground rules for the game. Sellers may
not sell like goods to different purchasers at different prices if the re-
sult may be to injure competition in... the sellers'. . . market ....
Id at 702. Under this language, a court can find injury to a specific competitor,
as a result of being forced out of business, without finding an injury to compe-
tition in general and absent the latter finding, there is no liability. See Gifford,
supra note 14, at 46 (stating that "the Court was unclear as to the exact nature
of competitive injury").
54. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 698, 701; see AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 15,
720(c), at 189 n.6 ('"he Court was unclear on which cost measurement it used
to find 'below-cost' pricing.").
The Court discussed at length the actions of the three national competi-
tors which could result in liability. In its discussion of Pet Milk's predatory
intent, the Court established the "double inference" test. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at
696 n.12 (stating that predatory or buccaneering pricing activity infers a rea-
sonable probability of "willful misconduct [that] may substantially lessen, in-
jure, destroy or prevent competition" (citation omitted)).
This footnote suggests subjective intent may have a place in the analysis
but also stresses that one can find anticompetitive effect in predatory pricing
and other similar objective measures of wrongdoing. Thus, it does not appear
that the Supreme Court mandates use of subjective intent to find liability
under the Robinson-Patman Act.
55. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 701.
56. Id. at 703. The Utah Pie Court's emphasis on the drastically declining
price structure also appears in the Court's statements that the cases on which
the defendants were relying lacked declining price structures. Id at 703-04
n.15; see also American Academic Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 922
F.2d 1317, 1322 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding no violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act because the "evidence to which the Supreme Court attached great impor-
tance ... a drastically declining price structure ... is missing from this case").
In Utah Pie, all parties were cutting prices. Utah Pie's price dropped 34%,
from $7.75 to $4.15. The defendants' prices dropped 30% (Pet Milk), 32% (Car-
nation), and 75% (Continental Baking). See Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 690-91.
In discussing how a rapidly declining price structure could harm competi-
tion, the Court noted that "a competitor who is forced to reduce his price to a
new all-time low in a market of declining prices will in time feel the financial
pinch and will be a less effective competitive force." d at 699-700. Although
this language refers to the impact on a competitor, the Court evidences its con-
cern about the rapidly declining price structure's impact on competition in its
use of the phrase "less effective competitive force." Further, the Court contin-
ued its analysis by noting that even if the impact on Utah Pie was negligible,
"there remain the consequences to others in the market who had to compete
not only with Continental's [low price] . . .but [also] with Utah's even lower
price . . . ." Id. Within a short space the Court pointed to injury to both a
competitor and competition as the requisite competitive injury for a Robinson-
Patman Act violation. Id. Possibly at this relatively early juncture, the Court
did not realize the significance of the difference between the two. The dissent,
however, realized that the majority's interpretation focused on harm to a spe-
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ously suggested that market concentration had increased.57
Based on this evidence, the Court stated that a jury could infer
that the national pie companies' behavior inflicted competitive
injury.58
2. Response to Utah Pie
Utah Pie became the focus of intense. academic criticism.5 9
Critics predicted that the Utah Pie decision would chill vigor-
ous price competition, an important ingredient in a healthy,
competitive economy.60  Commentators believed that sup-
pressing competition with an overly strict standard would pit
Utah Pie against recognized antitrust goals of protection and
promotion of competition.61
In 1975, two critics of Utah Pie, Harvard law professors
Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, wrote a seminal article on
cific competitor rather than on harm to competition in general. See id. at 705
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. See Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 691-92 n.7, 700. The Court cited evidence that
Utah Pie's and the defendants' control of the market increased from 81%
(1959) to 87% (1960) to 92% (1961). Id- at 691-92 n.7. The Court also consid-
ered that the number of other competitors dropped from nine to eight be-
tween 1960 and 1961. Id. at 700. Although increasing concentration and fewer
sllers are indicative of a less competitive market, the Court's interpretation
and subsequent use of this "evidence" is misleading. The combined concentra-
tion of the parties' market share did increase between 1960 and 1961, but the
single figure obscures the fact that the price competition broke Utah Pie's
stranglehold on the market; Utah Pie's share dropped from a monopolistic
66% to 45%. Id. Even the dissent in Utah Pie recognized that Salt Lake City's
frozen pie market had become more competitive. Id. at 705 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). Commentators support Justice Stewart's view. See, ag., Gifford,
supra note 14, at 46 ("An examination of the effects of the price rivalry upon
market structure alone would lead to the superficial conclusion that the mar-
ket had become more, rather than less, competitive.").
58. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 702-03.
59. LaRue, supra note 34, at 144; see Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade
by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70, 84 (1967) (stating
that Utah Pie prohibits innocent competitive behavior).
60. Bowman, supra note 59, at 70. Courts also recognize that price plays
an important role in the competitive process. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (stating that "cutting prices in or-
der to increase business often is the very essence of competition"); Interna-
tional Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 1975)
(stating that the court's "goal in applying the Robinson-Patman Act is to main-
tain active competition-including price rivalry-among members of the busi-
ness community"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
61. Atlas Building Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d
950, 954 (10th Cir. 1959) ("Antitrust legislation is concerned primarily with the
health of the competitive process, not with the individual competitor who
must sink or swim in competitive enterprise."), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843
(1960).
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predatory pricing claims.62 Although Areeda and Turner fo-
cused on predatory pricing as antitrust injury under the Sher-
man Act, they also addressed the relevance of predatory pricing
under the Robinson-Patman Act.63 According to Areeda and
Turner:
The basic substantive issues raised by the Robinson-Patman Act's con-
cern with primary-line injury to competition and by the Sherman
Act's concern with predatory pricing are identical. If the Sherman
Act is properly interpreted to permit a monopolist to discriminate in
price so long as his lower price equals or exceeds marginal cost, such
discrimination is afortiori permissible for firms with lesser degrees of
market power, and the Robinson-Patman Act should be interpreted
no differently in primary-line cases unless the statutory language or
compelling legislative history dictates otherwise. 6 4
Although neither the courts nor academic critics have uni-
versally embraced the Areeda-Turner test,65 post-1975 analyses
of predatory pricing under both the Sherman and Robinson-
Patman Acts have reacted to this hypothesis.66 Until the Rose
Acre decision in 1989, courts analyzing concurrent predatory
62. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). In
this article, Areeda and Turner offered a cost-based test to determine whether
a firm's pricing behavior is predatory. See also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note
15, 11 711-722.
[Applying standard economic theory] that marginal cost pricing leads
to a proper allocation of resources in the short run and claiming that
the only explanation for below-marginal cost pricing is exclusionary
behavior, Areeda and Turner hold that:
a. Any price at or above 'reasonably anticipated' short-run marginal
cost is nonpredatory.
b. A price below 'reasonably anticipated' short-run marginal cost is
predatory, unless at or above average total cost. But a presump-
tively valid price at or above average total cost is subject to rebut-
tal proof that the price was substantially below marginal cost, and
hence predatory.
c. Since data on marginal costs are difficult to obtain, average varia-
ble costs, which are much easier to ascertain, should be used by
the courts as a surrogate for marginal costs in the above formula-
tion, unless average variable costs fall significantly below marginal
cost in the relevant range of output.
Calvani & Lynch, supra note 36, at 380-81 (citing AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 15, %% 711(d), 715(a), (b) & (d)).
63. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 15, % 720(c).
64. Id % 720(c), at 190.
65. See Calvani & Lynch, supra note 36, at 381 & n.45, for a bibliography
of the literature as of 1982 discussing Areeda and Turner's analysis.
66. Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 34, at 111-12 n.83 (summarizing the ap-
proaches courts have taken toward predatory pricing). "[Tihe Areeda-Turner
rule 'has provided either the analytical foundation or the point of departure
for most' post-1975 predatory pricing decisions." Calvani & Lynch, supra note
36, at 395 n.169 (quoting Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 34, at 78).
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pricing claims under the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts
advocated using a unified approach under both Acts.67
3. Courts Applying a Unified Approach
Since Areeda and Turner published their seminal article,
most courts have utilized a uniform approach when analyzing
alleged predatory pricing violations, regardless of whether the
plaintiff bases her complaint on the Sherman or Robinson-Pat-
man Act. Under "uniform approach" jurisprudence, if the
court finds that a defendant violated the Sherman Act, the
court will also find the defendant liable under a properly
claimed violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Although the courts have utilized a uniform approach, they
have not utilized the same uniform approach; courts instead
choose from three distinct tests for predatory pricing. Several
circuits have adopted some variation of the Areeda-Turner cost-
price test for categorizing pricing behavior.68 One circuit, how-
ever, put a gloss on the test for predatory pricing by adopting a
"rule of impossibility" or recoupment theory.69 A final circuit
interpreted the Acts' legislative histories to allow the use of di-
rect, subjective evidence of predatory intent to analyze preda-
tory pricing violations.70
The first support for a unified approach under both stat-
utes came from the Fifth Circuit's 1975 decision in Interna-
tional Air Industries v. American Excelsior Co..71 This court
analyzed both claims with a cost-price test patterned after
Areeda and Turner's recommendation.72 Other appellate
67. Although most courts advocate use of a unified approach to the analy-
sis, they disagree on the best test to use to discern predatory pricing. See A.A.
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990). The American Bar Association's Anti-
trust Section recognized in 1980 that:
Although some of the court decisions [discussing Areeda-Turner] in-
volved only Sherman Act Section 2 claims, these decisions are instruc-
tive on the question of primary line injury under the Robinson-
Patman Act, since the courts have agreed with Areeda and Turner
that the basic substantive issues raised by Sherman Act predatory
pricing cases and Robinson-Patman Act primary line cases are
identical.
The Robinson-Patman Ackr Policy and Law, 1 A.B.A. ANTITRUsT SECTION,
MONOGRAPH No. 4, at 1, 81 (1980).
68. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
71. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
72. Id. at 720-25. Originally, the plaintiff had filed predatory pricing
claims under both Acts. After the jury found for the defendant on both
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courts adopting a uniform approach, and utilizing a variant of
the Areeda-Turner test, followed in rapid succession. 73 Most of
these courts saw no conflict in analyzing Sherman Act and
Robinson-Patman Act claims with a uniform approach despite
the existence of Utah Pie.74
claims, the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court should have directed
a verdict only on the Robinson-Patman Act claim. Id. at 720 n.10. The court,
expressing its surprise at the plaintiff's decision not to appeal the Sherman
Act claim, stated that it "believe[d] that the basic substantive issues raised by
the two statutes . . .are identical." Id. The court went on to say that the
plaintiff's counsel might believe that the Robinson-Patman Act's language re-
quired a lesser evidentiary burden than did the Sherman Act. Id. The specific
language referred to in the Robinson-Patman Act states "where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition." 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The court concurred with Areeda and Tur-
ner's analysis that if pricing is not predatory, as determined by whatever test,
then it becomes unnecessary to construe the "may be" language. Interna-
tional Air, 517 F.2d at 720 n.10. Without evidence of predatory pricing behav-
ior that reduces competition in general, a defendant is not liable under either
Act. Id.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the use of a unified analysis in Malcolm v. Mar-
athon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981). In
Malcolm Oil, the court stated that "[p]redatory pricing violates... the Sher-
man Act... when there is an attempt to monopolize, .... the Clayton Act...
when the predation includes price discrimination .... and ... the Robinson-
Patman Act ... under any circumstances. The issues, with regard to predation
are the same under all those provisions." Id. at 853 n.16.
73. See D.E. Rogers Assocs. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1436-38
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro
Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 346-50 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982);
Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Pacific Eng'g. & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
74. In its discussion of a unified approach, the court in Pacifiw Engineer-
ing first noted that some cases suggest that discriminatorily low prices, short
of qualifying as predatory and a violation of the Sherman Act, might violate
the Robinson-Patman Act. Pacifc Eng7., 551 F.2d at 798 (citing Areeda &
Turner, supra note 62, at 726). Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386
U.S. 685 (1967), was one of the cases cited in Pacific Engineering. See Pacific
Engtg, 551 F.2d at 798. The reference to Utah Pie did not stop the Pacific En-
gineering court from applying a uniform approach in its analysis primarily for
two reasons. First, the court felt bound to follow the Supreme Court's admo-
nition to reconcile the antitrust laws. Id; see supra notes 28-33 and accompa-
nying text. Second, the court perceived no conflict between the laws because
"primary-line decisions have consistently emphasized the element of preda-
tion." Pacifw EngVq., 551 F.2d at 798. The Pacific Engineering court did not
read Utah Pie as calling for anything other than a finding of predation, an ele-
ment in both a Robinson-Patman and Sherman Act claim. See id
The court in Janich Brothers used a uniform approach because both Acts
"are directed at the same economic evil and have the same substantive con-
tent." 570 F.2d at 855 (citing Areeda & Turner, supra note 62, at 727). This
case is also interesting in that the court used the Robinson-Patman Act's stan-
dard of injury to interpret an alleged monopolization attempt under the Sher-
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man Act. Id. At the start of its analysis of the Sherman Act claim, the court
noted that in analyzing the Robinson-Patman Act claim the jury had not
found a substantial effect on competition. The court went on to conclude that
"[b]ecause of the jury's decision, the section 2 [Sherman Act] claim would nec-
essarily have been decided against Janich." Id.
The Ninth Circuit later affirmed the use of a uniform approach in William
Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1041
(9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). The Ninth Circuit compared
the Inglis facts with those in Utah Pie. The plaintiff in Inglis had relied on
Utah Pie for the proposition that pricing below average total cost is enough to
uphold a jury's verdict of injury under the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 1041
n.48. The court disagreed because it did not read Utah Pie to establish a per se
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act if prices are found below total cost. Id.
In support of this contention, the court cited a case addressing another section
of the Robinson-Patman Act in which the Supreme Court refused to hold sales
below cost to be per se illegal. Id (citing United States v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1963) (stating that sales priced below cost may
further legitimate commercial objectives such as liquidation of excess, obso-
lete, or perishable merchandise or the need to meet competition)).
The court in Hommel echoed the idea that the Supreme Court did not es-
tablish a per se rule of illegality for prices below cost. Hammel, 659 F.2d at 351
(stating that "the Supreme Court did not indicate that the competitive harm
requirement could be satisfied merely by a showing of below-average cost pric-
ing"). The court in Hommel based its interpretation on simple economics:
[A]n additional sale at above marginal cost will increase short run net
returns. A seller faced with a choice of making a sale at above margi-
nal cost but below total cost, or foregoing the sale, will choose to
make the sale. Such a profit maximizing sale cannot be indicative of
predatory intent.
Id. The Hommel court, however, went on to concede grudgingly that "even if
Utah Pie would support the theory that predatory intent, and hence competi-
tive harm, could be shown merely by below-average cost pricing, such a theory
would only apply in a geographic price discrimination case." Id. at 352.
The Hommel case reached the appellate court after a jury found no viola-
tion under the "Sherman Act claim but found a violation on a Robinson-Pat-
man Act primary line injury claim. Id. at 342. Because the alleged Sherman
Act violation was not before the court, it did not directly reach the issue of
whether Sherman Act liability is identical to Robinson-Patman Act liability
for price differentials threatening primary line competition. Id. at 348 n.9.
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit reversed the lower court decision on the Robin-
son-Patman Act claim because it found no predatory intent, even though the
plaintiff had sold its product to selected customers in one geographic market
at prices below its average cost. Id. at 349-50. In reaching this conclusion, the
court cited, with agreement, Areeda and Turner's discussion about price dis-
crimination in the same geographic market. Id. at 349-50 n.12. Areeda and
Turner would not classify such pricing behavior as predatory under either an-
titrust law. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 62, at 725-27. Nor would Areeda
and Turner classify such pricing behavior as predatory under either law if em-
ployed in different geographic markets. Id at 726. Unless below marginal
cost, neither pricing behavior is predatory. It is therefore probable that the
Hommel court would accept both Areeda-Turner hypotheses and look for ob-
jective predatory conduct even in a case with parties in different geographic
areas, such as was the case in A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms,
Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990). In other
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In Henry v. Chloride, Inc.,75 the Eighth Circuit used a sec-
ond test for predatory pricing, although the court also used a
unified approach to the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman
Act claims.76 Defining its test, the Eighth Circuit stated that
the Supreme Court had "import[ed] a rule of impossibility into
predatory pricing cases: If the defendant could not have cap-
tured the market [in order to recoup its losses], its conduct can-
not be predatory, no matter what its 'intent.' "77 Courts
applying this recoupment test for predatory intent review not
only price factors, but also other circumstantial factors-such
as the defendant's relative size or entry barriers-which are
used to assess the economic plausibility of recouping losses af-
ter competition is eliminated.78
Contrary to these two tests which use objective evidence to
discern predatory intent, the Eleventh Circuit in McGahee v.
Northern Propane Gas Co.79 chose a third test and elevated the
importance of direct, subjective evidence to establish competi-
tive injury. 0 The court also employed a unified approach to
analyze alleged Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act
words, the Hommel court would probably use a unified approach to the analy-
sis of predatory pricing under either statute.
75. 809 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1345.
77. Id. (citing Matsushita Electric Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986)). This rule presumes that firms act rationally and would not engage
in predation if they could hiot successfully recoup their losses. Id. "The [Mat-
sushita] opinion repeatedly discusses a defendant's plausible or rational mo-
tives in acting.. . ." .Td. (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595-98). To assess its
chances of reducing competition, a firm would need to gauge the economic
plausibility of recovering the losses it sustains during the "low" stage of pric-
ing. Id. at 1344-45. In other words, the price-cutter must be able at least to
threaten domination of the market. Id. at 1345.
Although the Supreme Court decided Matsushita under the Sherman Act,
see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584-85, the Henry court advocated using a uniform
approach and interpreted Matsushita to put a gloss on the proper test for pred-
atory conduct under the Robinson-Patman Act as well. Henry, 809 F.2d at
1345. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Henry court's approach in Lomar '
Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 599 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988).
78. Henry, 809 F.2d at 1344.
79. 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
80. Id at 1496-1502. The court interpreted the Acts' legislative histories
and Supreme Court precedents to allow the use of subjective evidence. Id at
1500-02 (summarizing its review of the legislative history to show that "Con-
gress intended for subjective evidence of a defendant's intent to be relevant"
and citing several Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that "subjective
evidence is to be used" to determine whether a defendant has violated § 2 of
the Sherman Act or § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act).
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violations.8 1
Thus, prior to A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms,
Inc., the circuits agreed that they should treat predatory pricing
claims under the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act uni-
formly. The courts did not agree, however, on what that treat-
ment should be.8 2
II. THE DECISION IN ROSE ACRE
Against this background, the Seventh Circuit took a dual
approach to its analysis of the Sherman Act and Robinson-Pat-
man Act claims in A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms,
Inc. .83 The court recognized that a primary-line predatory pric-
81. I& at 1493 n.9 ('"The predatory pricing issues are the same for Sher-
man Act Claims as for Robinson-Patman Act claims.").
82. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates how three jurisdictions,
each applying their version of the predation test, would analyze predatory
pricing claims with a unified approach under the Sherman and Robinson-Pat-
man Acts. Under the hypothetical scenario, the court is evaluating the follow-
ing evidence:
1. Defendant entered a new geographic market and set its sales price
at a level which undercut its competitors but exceeded its average
variable costs.
2. Defendant charged different prices in its different geographic
markets during the period in question.
3. Numerous competitors comprise the market at issue and few bar-
riers to entry exist.
4. Plaintiff(s)' witnesses will testify that defendant's president, on
more than one occasion, declared her intent to "drive every com-
petitior out of business" regardless of current sacrifices her com-
pany had to endure.
Plaintiff has sued defendant under both § 2 of the Sherman Act for attempted
monopolization and § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act for price discrimina-
tion.
Based on these facts, courts from the three jurisdictions would apply their
predation test in the following manner. A court sitting in a jurisdiction em-
ploying a cost-price test would find the defendant not liable because its price
exceeds average variable cost. (This simplified illustration ignores the struggle
courts have faced when determining the proper price-cost relationship. See,
e.g., Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1345-46 (8th Cir. 1977) (listing vari-
ous cost-price relations courts use)). A court using the second test, the "re-
coupment theory," would also find the defendant not liable because the
market structure prevents it from deterring entry when it later charges mo-
nopoly prices to recoup current sacrifices. A court using the third test which
emphasizes subjective intent, however, may well find the defendant liable be-
cause she exhibited subjective intent to monopolize. All three courts would
use a unified approach, employing the predatory pricing test of choice, to ana-
lyze both the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Act claims. In comparison, the
Rose Acre court would dismiss the Sherman Act claim but could find liability
under the Robinson-Patman Act.
83. 881 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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ing violation under the Robinson-Patman Act has much in com-
mon with a predatory pricing violation under the Sherman Act
because in both "the aggressor sold goods for too little money,
hoping to cripple or discipline rivals." 4 Although the Seventh
Circuit found no liability under either law in Rose Acre, it em-
phasized that the tests are not identicals 5
The Rose Acre court first analyzed the plaintiffs' claim of
injury under the Sherman Act.8 6 The court held that subjec-
tive intent will not form "a basis of liability... in a predatory
pricing case under the Sherman Act. 8 7 Rather, the court chose
to follow a recoupment approach outlined in two recent
Supreme Court cases to discern injury to competition.88 The
Seventh Circuit found this approach superior to both the
cost/price relationship and subjective intent tests.8 9 Using its
84. Id at 1399.
85. Id at 1404, 1408.
86. Id at 1400.
87. Id. at 1402. The court began its analysis by recognizing that a "plain-
tiff's observation that it is losing business to a rival that has slashed prices is
consistent with both aggressive competition and predatory pricing." Id. at
1400. The court then reviewed the various methods which courts have fol-
lowed to separate predatory from competitive pricing, including pricing below
an appropriate measure of cost, subjective intent, and its own choice-the pos-
sibility of recoupment. Id. at 1400-01. (The Seventh Circuit had previously
adopted the recoupment approach in Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu
Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989)).
88. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) and Matsushita Electric Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986)). The Seventh Circuit in Rose Acre used the recoupment
theory in a manner somewhat different than did the Eighth Circuit in Henry
v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 75-78
and accompanying text (discussing the Henry case). The Eighth Circuit in
Henry recognized that circumstantial evidence in addition to pricing could be
used to infer predatory intent. 809 F.2d at 1344-45. The Seventh Circuit in
Rose Acre, however, used recoupment as a direct test for predation. 881 F.2d at
1401-03. The Rose Acre court read Cargill and Matsushita to employ such a
test. Id. at 1401. The court went on to say that "making likelihood of recoup-
ment the initial hurdle avoids not only questions of cost but also questions of
intent." Id.
89. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1401-02. The court recognized that if price is
less than cost, this fact "may reflect a sacrifice in the hope of suppressing com-
petition and collecting a monopoly profit later." Id at 1400. The court went
on to recognize, however, that circuits throughout the country are grappling
with exactly what the appropriate cost/price relationship is for the test. Id.
The existence of this struggle, indicating how difficult it is to determine the
existence of predatory pricing, supports the possibility of the recoupment test's
superiority. Id. at 1401.
The Seventh Circuit also found the possibility of recoupment test superior
to the subjective intent test for a number of reasons. Id at 1401-02. The court
determined that subjective intent fails to distinguish competitive statements
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recoupment test, the court found no predatory pricing and
therefore no Sherman Act violationP°
The Seventh Circuit applied a different approach, however,
to decide the Robinson-Patman Act claim. The court stated
that "[t]o conclude that Rose Acre did not engage in predatory
pricing is not necessarily to absolve it under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act."91 Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the
dissension caused by the Utah Pie decision,92 it interpreted that
case to suggest "that the Robinson-Patman Act condemns at
least some primary-line price discrimination that the Sherman
Act permits."93 The court reached this conclusion by reasoning
that under Utah Pie, subjective predatory intent,9 coupled with
unreasonably low prices, can form the basis of liability.9 5 Based
readily from those that are predatory. I& at 1402. The court also said that the
use of subjective intent complicates litigation by causing parties to "[t]raips[e]
through the warehouses of business in search of misleading evidence [which]
both increas[es] the costs of litigation and reduc[es] the accuracy of decisions."
Id. Finally, and foremost, the court observed that "[i]f courts use the vigorous,
nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of a forbidden 'intent,' they run the risk of
penalizing the motive forces of competition." Id The court based this obser-
vation on the simple fact that companies "intend" to do all the business they
can and will inevitably make statements to that effect. Id at 1401.
90. Id at 1404.
91. Id
92. Id.; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
93. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1405. The court acknowledged that many other
appellate courts had reached the conclusion that "the standard of primary-line
liability under the Robinson-Patman Act should be the same as that under § 2
of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1404.
94. Id. at 1406. In its discussion of subjective intent, the Seventh Circuit
addressed the double inference test. Id. at 1400 (stating that "[i]f a seller plans
to drive out competition by fowl [sic] means, then the court infers that its price
is unlawfully low now and will be too high later"). See supra note 37 (explain-
ing the double inference test). The Rose Acre court criticized the double infer-
ence test for clouding the importance of predatory pricing. It stated: "Some
courts almost seem to overlook the fact that predatory pricing is the evil, and
write sometimes as if the conduct is important only because it is evidence of
the firm's evil intent." Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1400 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAmp, ANTITRUST LAw I 714.2b n.5 (Supp. 1988)).
To the Seventh Circuit, therefore, predatory pricing is a separate concept
from predatory intent. The court's extreme care to distinguish the concepts
may be a matter of semantics. The Seventh Circuit recently revisited analysis
of predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act in American Academic
Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 922 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1991). There, the
court acknowledged that the Supreme Court seemed to equate these terms in
Utah Pie. Id. at 1322. Areeda and Turner also acknowledge that using objec-
tive tests to prove predatory intent, a subjective concept, tends to erode the
objective/subjective distinction. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra, 1 701-02.
95. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1406. In reaching this conclusion, the Rose Acre
court stated that Utah Pie found the Robinson-Patman Act to protect competi-
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upon this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a com-
pany may violate the Robinson-Patman Act without violating
section 2 of the Sherman Act. The court found, however, that
the plaintiff did not violate the Robinson-Patman Act because
it had not practiced price discrimination.96 Consequently, the
circuits have split over whether a unified approach is appropri-
ate for analyzing violations under the Sherman and Robinson-
Patman Acts.
III. PREDATORY PRICING UNDER THE ANTITRUST
LAWS: USE OF A UNIFIED APPROACH IS
APPROPRIATE
Lacking direction from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have developed three distinct tests to analyze alleged predatory
pricing violations. Two methods rely on objective evidence
tors, rather than competition in general. IM. at 1404. The First Circuit inde-
pendently followed this approach in Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler,
Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 529 (1st Cir. 1989). Without discussing the use of objective
or subjective evidence of intent or whether a cost-price or recoupment test is
superior to discern predation, the Monahan court simply stated that the
Robinson-Patman Act protects competitors. IM. at 528. It reached this conclu-
sion by focusing on language Congress added to the 1936 amendments, see
supra note 27, rather than the original language of the Clayton Act, see supra
note 25, which addresses competitive injury in the primary line context.
96. Rose Acre, 581 F.2d at 1406. This legal, as opposed to economic, price
discrimination means that "under the Robinson-Patman Act, a firm is entitled
to charge the same price to everyone even though its costs differ." Id Eco-
nomic price discrimination occurs when a firm sells its product at different
price-cost ratios. Id- This can occur when a seller charges customers in differ-
ent geographic locations the same price regardless of differences in costs such
as for transportation. Id. If a firm charges different prices due to differing
costs, the firm must justify the cost differences under the Robinson-Patman
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988); see 3 KINTNE, supra note 19, § 19.7 (discussing
the cost justification defense). In Rose Acre, the defendant sold eggs at the
same price to customers in different cities. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1406. This is
not illegal price discrimination. I&.
Plaintiffs also alleged price discrimination in defendants' practice of
charging different prices to different customers, and giving different numbers
of "specials" to different customers. IM. When the court analyzed these allega-
tions, it found no basis for a violation for the first charge because the price dif-
ference resulted from a difference in the timing of the contracts. Id. at 1407.
The court stated that "[n]o case of which we are aware holds, however, that
fluctuations over time to the same customer are 'price discrimination' within
the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act." Id Similarly, the plaintiffs failed
to prove the second allegation because they failed to calculate the mean price
paid by customers for regular and "special" eggs. IM. Additionally, the "spe-
cials" were not necessarily the same grade and quality as regularly priced eggs,
another justification for price differences. Id- at 1407-08.
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either of a firm's cost-price relation 97 or an industry's market
structure to determine violations. 98 The third method allows
direct proof of a defendant's subjective intent to harm the com-
petitive process by driving out competition.99 When developing
these tests, courts were often called upon to assess Robinson-
Patman and Sherman Act claims concurrently. In so doing,
courts recognized that predatory pricing claims under the two
Acts are substantively similar; they employed the same ap-
proach using the test of their choice to analyze charges under
either law. 0 0
In 1989, however, the Seventh Circuit's decision in A.A
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. concluded that the
Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts called for different ap-
proaches to predatory pricing claims.1 1 A thorough analysis of
97. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. Although the courts use
some form of cost-price test, it is probable that no two tests are exactly the
same. See Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1345-46 (8th Cir. 1987) (listing
various cost-price relations used by courts).
98. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Rose Acre indicated
that, but for the Supreme Court's decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Bak-
ing Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), the Seventh Circuit would apply a market struc-
ture theory to alleged predatory pricing violations under the Robinson-Patman
Act. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1404-06.
99. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. Although the First Cir-
cuit in Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc. held that "evidence of a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, showing injury only to competitors,
does not automatically show a violation of the Sherman Act as well," it did not
outline means by which such injury to competitors could be shown. 866 F.2d
525, 529 (1st Cir. 1989). Thus, it is possible that a fourth test exists to deter-
mine a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
It is more likely, however, that the Monahan court was pointing to one or
more of the tests already presented. In its discussion of the Robinson-Patman
Act, the court alluded to Congress's concern over large chain stores driving
smaller competitors out of business so they could charge monopoly prices. Id.
The court merely stated, however, that "[t]he evidence in this case ... would
not permit a finding that any such result is at all likely. [The evidence] does
not... show ... the likely disappearance of smaller firms, to the point where
the market would become significantly more concentrated." Id. One could in-
terpret this language as allowing the use of subjective intent to harm competi-
tors or objective evidence of the industry's market structure to assess the
probability of recoupment by keeping competitors out once they have been
ousted, as did the court in Henry, 809 F.2d at 1345; see supra notes 75-78 (dis-
cussing the test in Henry).
100. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. Although this appears
to lead to redundancy in the antitrust laws, one should note that firms can em-
ploy other means to monopolize. See supra note 36 (listing examples such as
industrial espionage, false advertising, threats, and agreements with competi-
tors to exclude rivals). Only when a firm chooses price as its weapon will the
two laws appear redundant.
101. 881 F.2d 1396, 1406 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 U.S. 1326 (1990).
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the antitrust laws, however, does not indicate that courts must
employ different approaches. Both statutes require proof of an-
ticompetitive effect, which one should properly view as harm to
competition in general. Further, it appears that the Seventh
Circuit could have factually distinguished the Supreme Court's
decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. without vio-
lating stare decisis.
A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
1. The Statutes' Language
Courts analyzing claims brought under either the Sherman
or Robinson-Patman Act must interpret the statute's language
to discern what behavior is prohibited. Courts and commenta-
tors agree that Congress passed the Sherman Act to protect
competition. The Act's formal title, "an Act to protect trade
and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,"
renders this goal explicit.10 2 Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which courts have construed to include predatory pricing
claims, expressly refers to the illegality of monopolization or at-
tempted monopolization of trade or commerce. 10 3 Through
Congress's declaration of these acts as unlawful, courts analyz-
ing claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act have found con-
gressional intent to protect competition.1' 4
Dissatisfied with judicial interpretation and enforcement of
the Sherman Act, Congress later passed the original portion of
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,10 5 which prohibits
price discrimination that reduces competition or tends to create
a monopoly.10 6 To deal with secondary level antitrust injuries,
Congress added the Robinson-Patman Act amendments in 1936,
addressing price discrimination that affects a competitor.10 7
Predatory pricing claims arise, however, at the primary level,
102. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); see supra note 35 (quoting the statutory
language).
104. "The Sherman Act was .. .aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958).
105. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The Robinson-Patman
Act amended § 2 of the Clayton Act. It is therefore the Clayton Act's original
language and legislative history that is pertinent to a discussion of price dis-
crimination and predatory pricing. See supra notes 25-27.
106. See supra note 25 (quoting the statutory language).
107. See supra note 27 (noting that secondary line discrimination refers to
price discrimination at the buyer level).
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which the statute addressed before amendment. 08 Therefore,
when searching the statute's language for guidance on prohib-
ited behavior in a primary line context, courts should strive to
define injury to competition.10 9
2. Legislative History
Not only does the original statutory language support the
idea of prohibiting behavior that injures competition in general,
but the legislative history does as well. The House Judiciary
Committee echoed the words of the statute, stressing that the
Clayton Act was aimed at those business concerns seeking to
secure a monopoly or to destroy competition by using price dis-
crimination n. 0 By specifying the particular unfair trade prac-
tice, price discrimination, Congress supplemented the Sherman
Act's general language.
3. General Policy
A consideration of general policy reasons also supports the
use of a unified approach to predatory pricing. Congress
designed the antitrust laws to protect competition. To this end,
the Supreme Court mandated reconciliation of the laws on sev-
eral occasions.'" Courts should therefore interpret and apply
the Robinson-Patman Act to protect competition in a primary
line context. If a firm's pricing behavior does not harm compe-
tition by enabling that firm to monopolize, its low prices consti-
tute legitimate price competition.
The antitrust statutes' language and legislative history, as
well as general policy, support the contention that Congress in-
tended to protect competition in general from the ill effects of
discriminatory pricing at the primary level. The Sherman and
Robinson-Patman Acts overlap to prohibit a firm from discrimi-
nating on price in a predatory manner in an attempt to monop-
olize. Thus, if courts employ a unified approach to claims
108. See supra notes 25-26.
109. See supra note 37 (distinguishing injury to competition and injury to a
competitor). Contra Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d
525, 528 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the statute's language calls for a finding of
harm to a competitor); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. 881
F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Utah Pie as reading the statutory
language to call for use of an "injury to competitor" standard), cerL denied,
110 U.S. 1326 (1990).
110. See supra note 26.
111. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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involving this overlap, they should reap the benefits of more ac-
curate and consistent decisions, as well as judicial efficiency.
The Rose Acre court agreed that policy considerations sup-
port the use of a unified approach to analyze the same injury-
predatory pricing-under either statute, but it stated that
Supreme Court precedent precludes adopting a policy-based
analysis. To use a unified approach requires interpreting the
Robinson-Patman Act to protect competition in general, rather
than specific competitors. This interpretation, according to the
Rose Acre court, is precluded by Utah Pie. Rose Acre inter-
preted Utah Pie to stand for protection of competitors from
price discrimination. Use of a unified approach would therefore
violate stare decicis." 2
B. UTAH PIE REVISITED: DOES IT MANDATE DIFFERENT
APPROACHES?
1. Rose Acre's Interpretation of the Utah Pie Holding
The Rose Acre court stated that Utah Pie stands for the
proposition that subjective intent to harm a competitor, com-
bined with injury to that competitor, constitutes a violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act.? 3 Rose Acre's interpretation of
Utah Pie therefore forecloses the use of tests for predatory
pricing claims under the Robinson-Patman Act which employ
only objective evidence to discern predatory intent. Thus,. ac-
cording to Rose Acre, if a plaintiff establishes injury to itself as
a competitor and provides subjective evidence of intent, Utah
Pie requires inferior courts to find liability. 1 4
The Utah Pie court's analysis is unclear, however, about
the standard of competitive injury the Robinson-Patman Act
requires. The Utah Pie Court stressed "injury to competition,"
while speaking in terms of "injury to competitors."'1 5 This rea-
soning is not illogical; competitors are hurt if competition is
hurt. Yet the Court's interchangeable use of both terms, in
light of today's more sophisticated analysis, muddied the wa-
ters.11 6 Contrary to the position the Rose Acre court seems to
have taken, Utah Pie's holding appears ambiguous. Courts
112. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1404.
113. Id- at 1406.
114. 1&.
115. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 37 (noting that the difference between injury to compe-
tition and to a competitor is key to the analysis of a Robinson-Patman Act
claim).
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should read Utah Pie informed by subsequent cases in which
the Supreme Court has admonished lower courts to reconcile
the antitrust laws. A survey of such cases indicates injury to
competition is the appropriate standard for a Robinson-Patman
Act violation.
2. Critique of Rose Acre's Methodology
A Robinson-Patman plaintiff must prove two elements to
establish a prima facie case: price discrimination and anticom-
petitive effect.117 Accepting arguendo, that the Robinson-Pat-
man Act requires proof of injury to competition in general, the
Rose Acre court still faced a hurdle with regard to the use of
subjective intent to prove competitive injury. Most other cir-
cuits acknowledge that Utah Pie looked for predatory intent to
establish an anticompetitive effect, but these courts did not au-
tomatically leap to the conclusion that the Court's decision
meant direct, subjective predatory intent only.118 Indeed, most
circuits have steered clear of direct, subjective intent 119 and
have focused on a double inference test' 20 to determine
whether the defendant exhibited the requisite predatory intent.
When employing the double inference test, courts look only for
objective evidence of prices below an appropriate measure of
cost or a market structure indicating that recoupment of losses
is improbable.321 A court therefore need not consider a plain-
tiff's subjective intent to harm a competitor in its analysis.
The Rose Acre court, however, did not use the double infer-
ence test to discern predatory intent.22 Rather, the court in-
117. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
118. Utah Pie indicates a place for, but does not mandate, the use of direct,
subjective intent. The Utah Pie court seemed to use the concepts of predatory
pricing and predatory intent interchangeably, thereby allowing the develop-
ment of the double inference test. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
386 U.S. 685, 696-97 (1967). Since Utah Pie, courts have based the double infer-
ence test on objective evidence of cost-price relations and market structure.
See supra note 37 (citing cases which used the double inference test and ex-
plaining that courts rely on objective evidence of predatory intent when they
look for the presence of predatory pricing).
119. One exception is the court in MaGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co.,
858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
120. See supra note 37 (explaining the double inference test).
121. See supra note 37 (discussing objective versus subjective evidence of
predatory intent).
122. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1406 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).
In its discussion of the double inference test, the Rose Acre court recog-
nized the inherent difficulty in determining the appropriate nature of a firm's
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terpreted Utah Pie's search for predatory intent to mandate the
finding of liability under the Robinson-Patman Act in the face
of direct, subjective intent.123 The court found subjective intent
in statements such as: "We are going to run you out of the egg
business. Your days are numbered."'12
Courts and commentators have discussed at length the
proper role, if any, of subjective intent in antitrust litigation.125
Although not unanimous, most argue against using subjective
intent because "[i]ntent does not help to separate competition
from attempted monopolization and invites juries to penalize
hard competition. It also complicates litigation."'2 6 Rose Acre's
interpretation of Utah Pie once again brings the issue of subjec-
tive intent in predatory pricing analysis to the forefront. Had
Rose Acre chosen to do so, however, the court could have ana-
lyzed the Robinson-Patman Act claim without resorting to evi-
dence of subjective intent.
3. Factual Distinctions that Affect Application of Utah Pie to
Rose Acre
The Rose Acre court also failed to address important fac-
tual differences between its case and Utah Pie. The Utah Pie
court stressed the presence of a "drastically declining price
structure.' ' 2 7 Utah Pie had entered the market pricing its fro-
zen pies at $4.15 per dozen and was selling at $2.75 per dozen at
the time it filed suit, a drop of thirty-four percent. Its competi-
tors experienced similar, or much greater, price declines.us
Rose Acre, by contrast, makes no mention of a "drastically fall-
ing price structure."'2 9 In Utah Pie, the pie market was highly
cost-price relations. Id at 1401. That difficulty, coupled with recent Supreme
Court decisions favoring the use of a recoupment theory to prove predation,
prompted the Seventh Circuit to adopt a recoupment test for alleged Sherman
Act violations. Id Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's approach in Henry v.
Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit believed that
the recoupment theory could not be used to analyze Robinson-Patman Act
claims because the theory did not allow for subjective predatory intent. See
Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1406.
123. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1404.
124. Id
125. See supra notes 37, 89 (discussing dangers of using subjective intent in
predatory pricing analysis).
126. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1402.
127. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 (1967); see
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the rapidly declining
price structure and its effect on competition).
128. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 690.
129. The plaintiffs' expert witness was the only one to mention anything
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concentrated,130 whereas the egg market in Rose Acre was un-
concentrated.131 In Utah Pie, the aggregate market share of the
four parties to the suit increased from eighty-seven percent to
ninety-two percent while the number of sellers had de-
creased.132 The egg market, on the other hand, enjoyed new
entrants during the relevant period.133 In addition, the Utah
Pie Court appeared unable to identify any legitimate reason for
the rapidly declining price structure (although today many
commentators would presume this situation resulted from vig-
orous, healthy price competition). The Rose Acre court, how-
ever, identified new technology and vertical integration along
with plain, old-fashioned price competition as direct reasons for
lower prices. 13
The Seventh Circuit in Rose Acre did not use Utah Pie's
factual differences to distinguish the cases. 1' Yet shortly after
deciding Rose Acre, the Seventh Circuit distinguished another
alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman Act from Utah Pie by
noting the lack of evidence showing a "drastically declining
price structure."'136  Thus the Seventh Circuit could-and
should-have distinguished Rose Acre from Utah Pie because
the distinctions are important.
4. Rationale for Using a Unified Approach
Unless the statutory language, legislative history, or gen-
eral policy considerations demand different analyses, using dif-
ferent approaches to predatory pricing injuries under the
Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts appears to complicate an
about the egg market's price structure. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1398, 1403.
Although this expert stated that prices were declining, the opinion provides
little data and does not mention a "drastically declining price structure." This
lack of emphasis suggests that the egg market's price structure was not "dras-
tically declining."
130. See Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 700. The top four firms in the pie market
controlled 92% of the market. Id.
131. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1403. The plaintiffs did not compute concentra-
tion ratios, see id., but the defendant controlled only nine percent of the mar-
ket, id at 1398, a far cry from the leader in the pie market which controlled
45% of the market. See Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 691-92 n.7.
132. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 700; see supra note 57 (noting that the Court's
use of this "evidence" is misleading).
133. Rose Acre, 881 F.2d at 1398, 1403 (stating that "Rose Acre did nothing
to stem the inflow of productive capacity").
134. Id at 1404.
135. See id at 1405.
136. American Academic Suppliers v. Beckley-Cardy, 922 F.2d 1317, 1322
(7th Cir. 1991).
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already complex area of the law needlessly. Because the
Supreme Court has admonished courts to reconcile the anti-
trust laws whenever possible, courts should search no further
than to design the most appropriate test to handle the situation
under either statute.
Use of a uniform approach to predatory pricing claims
would also create judicial efficiencies. Concurrent claims under
the Acts happen with some frequency, 137 and use of a unified
approach would allow courts to consider only once whether a
plaintiff had satisfied its burden of proof for competitive in-
jury.13 8 Other efficiencies arise as courts become more adept
and precise with their analysis. An added benefit of this effi-
ciency would accrue to attorneys as they advise clients. Coun-
sel would be in a better position to assess the impact of their
clients' actions with regard to these laws.
Finally, but most importantly, courts-including the
Supreme Court--could concentrate on designing the best test to
discern predatory pricing, after settling the issue of a unified
approach. For example, courts and commentators have raised
valid concerns about the propriety of subjective intent in preda-
tory pricing. 3 9 Additionally, the cost-price tests for predation
are quite varied.' 40 As predatory pricing analysis focuses on the
"best test," a consensus could build supporting one method over
another. To seek the "best test" is a most appropriate goal be-
cause "mistaken inferences in cases . . . [involving predatory
137. See supra note 73 (listing cases with concurrent Sherman and Robin-
son-Patman Act claims).
138. Some courts and commentators have noted that the Sherman and
Robinson-Patman Acts may call for different degrees of injury or certainty of
injury in predatory pricing claims, i.e., that Congress passed the Robinson-Pat-
man Act to reach certain unfair trade restraints earlier than the Sherman Act
might. See supra note 72 (addressing evidentiary burdens the Acts place on
plaintiffs). Yet courts have also interpreted the Sherman Act to attack certain
practices in their incipiency. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945) (stressing that the Sherman Act "also covered pre-
liminary steps [taken toward monopoly], which, if continued, would lead to it.
... [These steps] are dangerous and the law will nip them in the bud"). Thus
a unified approach would seem to allow courts to decide if a plaintiff has in-
jured competition under both Acts. To analyze a given set of data once will
result in time and cost savings. Currently, the "costs of litigating predation
cases are staggering- no more complex cases could be imagined." Frank H.
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 336 (1981).
139. See supra notes 37, 89 (discussing the dangers of using subjective in-
tent in predatory pricing analysis).
140. See Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1345-46 (8th Cir. 1987) (dis-
cussing cases which use various cost-price tests).
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pricing] are especially costly, because they chill the very con-
duct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. ' '141
CONCLUSION
Courts were well on their way to settling on the use of a
unified approach to predatory pricing claims brought under the
Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts when the Seventh Circuit
complicated matters with its Rose Acre decision. Neither the
relevant laws nor precedent, however, necessitate this dual ap-
proach. Unless and until the Supreme Court decides to the
contrary, courts that are bound by Rose Acre should construe
the opinion narrowly, and the rest should continue to reconcile
the antitrust laws by using a unified approach.
141. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
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